Contest success functions

100
In this section we study the properties of contest success functions (CSF).
101
In order to be specific about the properties of an NE, it would be nice to have an 102 idea of the form of CSF. Consider the following functional form: . . . , G i , . . . , G n ).
142
While these properties are standard, the next two properties are more specific 143 and relate winning probabilities in contests to different sets of active contestants.
144
Let p M i (G) be contestant i's probability of winning a contest played by a subset , for all G ≡ (G 1 , . . . , G i , . . . , G n ).
149
6 The name of this axiom refers to the fact that a contest can be interpreted as an auction where the prize is auctioned among the agents and efforts are bids. In standard auctions the higher bid obtains the prize with probability one. Here, any positive bid entitles the bidder with a positive probability to obtain the object, so it is as if the bidding mechanism did not discriminate perfectly among bids.
Team 1 against Team 2: 1 obtains 4 points and 2 obtains 1 point.
163
Team 1 against Team 3: 1 obtains 0 points and 3 obtains 6 points.
164
Team 2 against Team 3: 2 obtains 6 points and 3 obtains 0 points.
165
In this state of the world Team 2 wins the league because it gets 7 points. Teams 3 166 and 1 get 6 and 4 points, respectively.
167
In the second state of the world results are identical except for the following:
168
Team 1 against Team 3: 1 obtains 6 points and 3 obtains 0 points.
169
In this state of the world Team 1 wins the league because it gets 10 points. Teams 170 2 and 3 obtain 7 and 0 points, respectively. 
175
We now consider the following homogeneity property:
(H) ∀i ∈ N , p i ( ) is homogeneous of degree zero, i.e., p i (G) = p i (λG)
, ∀λ > 0.
177
(H) says that the probability of obtaining the prize is independent of units of mea- 
4) do not fulfill (H).
182 Skaperdas (1996) proved that (P1)-(P5) and (H) imply the form (2.1) with φ(G) =
183
G , ≥ 0. An unpleasant implication of (H) is that if p i ( ) is continuous in (0, 0, . . . , 0),
p i ( ) is constant (Corchón 2000) which contradicts (P2). Thus under (H), p i ( ) is dis-
185
continuous. Skaperdas (1996) also studied the logit form. He showed that this form 186 is equivalent to (P1)-(P5) plus an additional property that says that the probability of 187 success of a player only depends on the difference in the effort of players. Clarke and
188
Riis (1998) extended Skaperdas' results dropping the anonymity assumption. 
208
Now we present the following assumption:
209
Assumption 1 a) All agents have the same cost function C( ).
The interpretation of part b) Proof Assuming interiority, first order conditions of payoff maximization are,
The second order condition is fulfilled because (3.1) can be written as
and all terms in the right hand side of the equation are decreasing in G i , hence hand side of (3.1) is increasing in G i , we have that,
. . , n. Now (3.1) can be written as
Let the left hand side of (3.2) be denoted by (y). If y → 0 , (y) > 0, and if 245 y → ∞, A1c) and property iv) of φ(·) imply (y) < 0. Therefore the mean value 246 theorem implies that (3.1) has a solution that-by the previous reasonings-is a Nash 247 equilibrium. Since ( ) is strictly decreasing equilibrium is unique.
248
Lastly let us consider the case in which the first order condition does not hold with 249 equality, i.e., G * k = 0 and G * i > 0 for some k and i. In this case, from (3.1), the u n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f
The theory of contests: a survey concavity of φ( ) and the convexity of C( ) we have that
253
To end the proof notice that G * i = 0, ∀i is impossible because if an agent increases 254 effort by a small quantity, she wins the prize at a cost as close to zero as we wish
255
(because C(0) = 0 and C( ) is continuous). Thus, this situation cannot be an equilibrium.
257
The previous result was obtained by Nti (1997) assuming a = 0 and
258
Szidarovsky and Okuguchi (1997) generalized this result considering a CSF like 
The aggregate cost of effort is cny = (n − 1)V /n. 
setting x i ≡ φ(G i ) the previous expression can be written as
Unfortunately, results obtained in this class of games are non applicable here. The 281 reason is that they require monotonic best reply functions: either decreasing-i.e., stra-282 tegic substitution, Corchón (1994)-or increasing-i.e., strategic complementarity,
283
Vives (1990), Milgrom and Roberts (1990), Amir (1996) . 9 But in Example 1.1 we see 
where as we noticed before,
294
A similar argument proves that dy dV 0 > 0. Finally, writing (3.2) as follows
we see that the left hand side is strictly decreasing in n and the right hand side is 297 strictly increasing in y. Therefore, y and n vary in opposite directions and, thus, y is 298 strictly decreasing in n. (Szidarovsky and Okuguchi 1997) . 9 The concepts of strategic substitution and complementarity are due to Bulow et al. (1985) .
u n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f 
310
The condition V ≥ ρ guarantees that n * ≥ 1. As intuition suggests, the number of con-311 tenders depends positively on the value of the prize and negatively on the productivity 312 of the productive sector which is a measure of the opportunity cost of participating in 313 the contest.
314
An application of the above mechanism is that if a positive shock increases the The term originated as follows: In the 1960s the discovery of large reserves of gas in the North Sea raised the value of the Dutch currency. This increased imports and decreased exports negatively affecting the domestic industry. The use of the term was generalized later on to describe negative effects on real variables-GDP, etc.-of an increase in natural resources. It has also been translated to political science where the term "Political Dutch Disease" refers to the correlation between the size of oil reserves and the degree of authoritarianism.
u n c o r r e c t e d p r o o f point to recall when discussing the social desirability of contests.
334
3) Some agents may be better off as a consequence of the contest. In a symmetric 335 contest all contenders are better off if the contest is banished since they incur a 336 positive cost simply to maintain the probability of obtaining the prize. 
Basic properties of the model
338
In order to concentrate on the issues raised by asymmetries we will assume in this 339 section that the value of the prize does not depend on efforts, that is α = 0. Let us 340 start by assuming that the CSF is of the form (3.3). Then,
By a well-known result, NE are independent of linear transformations in payoffs.
346
Dividing the previous expression by V i and setting
Thus, under (3.3) lack of symmetry in the contest success function can be translated 349 to lack of symmetry in the cost function.
350
In the next result we will assume that the functions K i ( )'s are linear, see Cornes
351
and Hartley (2005) for the non linear case.
353
Notice that because α = 0, A2 implies A1c). Without loss of generality set
There are two interpretations of A2. In the first one the CSF is Gradstein (1995), namely
where q i can be interpreted as the prior probability that agent i wins the prize. Assume 
368
Proof First notice that the set of agents for which
"holes", i.e., if agent k belongs to this set, agent k − 1 also belongs since
Consider the following algorithm that begins with agent n and continues in decreas-
the algorithm stops and yields m = k. The algorithm stops before k = 1 because for
As we will see, this algorithm identifies active agents.
375
First order conditions of payoff maximization for i = 1, . . . , m are
It is easy to see that
is decreasing in y i . Thus second order conditions hold.
378
Adding up (4.2) over 1 to m, we have that (m−1)
379
From there and (4.2) again we get that
which yields the effort of active agents. Notice that y * i > 0 because i belongs to the 382 set for which
. For any other agent, say r the marginal payoff
Thus, y r = 0 is the optimal action of this agent. We will now prove that the previous equilibrium is unique. Let us consider an 387 arbitrary equilibrium. The first order condition is,
Let M ⊆ N be the set of active agents. For i ∈ M, we have that
Again, we see that the set of active agents cannot have "holes" because if i is active
392
and h is such that d h < d i and y * h = 0, we had
which is impossible. Suppose now that there are two equilibria. In the first, agents 1 to 395 k are active and in the second, agents 1 to h are active, with h > k. Thus agent h is not 396 active in the first equilibrium but is active in the second. By the previous reasonings 397 this implies
which is impossible because if agents are ordered in such a way that
Under the first interpretation, recall that y i = G i and
and the form of the contest success function used here,
Thus, agents who are more efficient (i.e., with lower c's, or larger V 's) make more 407 effort and have a greater probability of getting the prize than inefficient agents. 12 
Thus, more optimistic agents, (i.e., agents with large q i 's) make less effort and have a 418 greater probability of getting the prize than pessimistic agents (i.e., those with small 
Proof Consider first order conditions of payoff maximization for i = 1, 2:
From H, and p 1 = 1 − p 2 we get that
From these two equations we obtain G 
a Nash equilibrium is a list of efforts such that each agent chooses effort to maximize 467 her payoffs given the efforts decided by other agents, inside and outside her group. Let 468 X * and Y * be the Nash equilibrium values of X and Y . We will not be concerned with 469 existence or uniqueness of equilibrium (similar assumptions to those used before will 470 do the job). Instead we will be concerned with the properties of equilibrium. These will 471 be derived from first order conditions of payoff maximization that for active agents 472 read:
In a classic contribution, Olson (1965) asserted that the free rider problem inside large 476 groups is so acute that, in equilibrium, large groups exert less aggregate effort than 477 small groups, which explains the success of the latter. We will examine his conjecture 478 in the framework of our model. clear that equilibrium is symmetric inside each group, so G * i = X * /n 1 ∀i ∈ G 1 and
Hence (4.7) can be written as 
490
Proof Suppose that X * ≤ Y * and n 1 > n 2 . Then, X * /n 1 < Y * /n 2 and given that
which contradicts the equation above. Thus X * > Y * .
496
Let us now prove the result regarding individual efforts. From (H) and X * > Y * 497 using (4.8) we obtain that
which given that C ( ) is increasing, implies the desired result. 
519
Proof First order condition of profit maximization read
521 will make effortḠ and smaller groups will exert less effort than large ones.
From the equations above and (H) we get that
522 V 1 Y * V 2 X * = X * n 1 β−1 Y * n 2 β−1 . 523 Taking into account that V i = V /n α i the equation above reads n α 2 Y * n α 1 X * = X * n 1 β−1 Y * n 2 β−1 ⇐⇒ Y * X * = n 1 n 2 α−β+1
539
Finally we notice that if the contest success function were symmetric, in the 540 sense that the group that makes more effort wins the prize with greater probability,
541
Proposition 4.4 implies that the smaller group has better chances of getting the prize, 
Computing equilibrium for suitable functional forms we find that, in general, prior 554 and posterior do not coincide. Thus, the American system appears to be "less biased" 555 than its British counterpart, at least in the case of identical costs/valuations. 
Allocation of rights
Equilibrium is identical to that in Proposition 4.1. Notice that (4.9) implies that man-597 agers with higher productivity have a higher cost of rent-seeking. Thus, if p i is the 598 fraction of funds allocated by the centre, divisions with high productivity receive fewer 599 funds than those with low productivity, see (4.5). This points to a disturbing conclu-600 sion: in organizations where internal allocation of a resource is made by rent-seeking, 601 productive agents will obtain less than unproductive ones. The theory of contests: a survey is low (resp. high). Expected returns to a bandit, denoted by R B, are also a decreasing 615 function of q because when there are many (resp. few) producers it is easy (resp. 616 difficult) to find one. The proportion of bandits is in equilibrium when R P = R B.
617
It is not difficult to obtain multiple equilibria because both functions have negative 618 slope with respect to q (Acemoglu 1995). Murphy et al. (1991) showed that if talent 619 is necessary for growth an economy can be trapped in a low growth path in which 620 talented individuals work in rent-seeking activities. In these models two economies 621 with the same basic data can be in equilibria that are very far apart.
622
These models formalize the idea that an economy may get into a poverty trap in 623 which rent-seeking is determined by economic fundamentals. However, they imply 624 that there is nothing virtuous in rich economies-e.g., Northern European countries- North and Weingast (1989) discuss the events surrounding the Glorious Revolu-633 tion in Great Britain in 1688. They argue that under absolute monarchy, it was "very 634 likely…that the sovereign will alter property rights for his…own benefit" (id. p. 803).
635
The methods were taxes unapproved by the Parliament, unpaid loans, sale of monopoly 636 and peerage, purveyance or simply seizure. All these promoted rent-seeking activi- gests that countries that experienced no institutional change dramatically altered their 647 growth rates: Spain (1950 -1959 vs. 1960 -1974 ), India (1950 -1992 vs. 1993 -2005 648 and China, (1950-1975 vs. 1976-2005) . 17 In these cases the policies pursued in the 649 contrasting periods were very different but the basic institutions remained practically 650 16 The question is why the Parliament "…would not then proceed to act just like the king?" (id. p. 817). On the one hand the coordination necessary for this made "…rent-seeking activity on the part of both monarch and merchants more costly" (Ekelund and Tollinson 1981) . On the other hand, the legislative changes introduced by the Glorious Revolution made rent-seeking very difficult. Judges were elected from among prominent local people who had little incentive to punish those locals who defied monopoly laws selling goods at cheaper prices (Tullock 1992) . 17 Despite the similar experiences in terms of growth, these countries were politically very different: Spain was a right-wing dictatorship, India a democracy and China a left-wing dictatorship. implausible assumptions there is another equilibrium in which the Parliament is dom-662 inated by rent-seekers and the tax rate is identical to that under absolute monarchy. In 663 this equilibrium the size of rent-seeking is larger than under autocracy. This cast doubts 664 on the idea that "right" institutions necessarily promote good economic performance.
665
Finally, it is shown that rent-seekers may be interested in overthrowing autocracy. We will present a simple example that highlights this point and generalizes results
683
obtained by Posner (1975) . We assume that in a market there is a single consumer 684 18 The change in the growth rate was so sudden and permanent that these cases cast doubts on the theories of growth based on human capital. 19 This conclusion can be applied to the process of decolonization and suggests a reason for local rentseekers to fight against colonial powers. yields the monopolist output and profits, namely
The socially optimal allocation is found by maximizing social welfare defined as the 697 sum of consumer and producer surpluses, i.e.,
This function is concave because 
702
Evaluating social welfare in the optimum (W o ) and the equilibrium allocations (W E )
703
we obtain that
Denoting by R M the relative welfare loss due to misallocation in the market of the 706 good, we have that 
717
Denoting the relative welfare loss by R we have that
719
Notice that
.
721
Manipulating the previous expressions we obtain the following: 
725
The solid line in Fig. 1 5.2 The Coase theorem private and social costs will be equal" (Coase 1988, p. 158) . This result though, masks 734 the fight for the property rights that may result in a wasteful conflict (Jung et al. 1995) .
735
For instance, suppose that two contenders fight for a property right that they value 
that agents can influence the allocation of the right by incurring expenses G 1 and G 2 .
743
Denoting by p 1 the probability that agent 1 obtains the property right,
and V 2 ≡ r v 1 +v 2 2 + (1 − r )v 2 the previous equations read
Since agents take r as given the first payoff function is strategically equivalent to 
, i = j = 1, 2.
754
If rent-seeking expenses are totally wasteful the total expected welfare loss is
756
21 This corresponds to the so-called standard solution in bargaining theory, see Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p. 846) . For an analysis of the welfare losses yielded by different bargaining rules see Anbarci et al. (2002) .
Since V 1 and V 2 are functions of r , W L can be written as W L(r ). We easily see that 
We will assume the social welfare function is
where α can be interpreted as the proportion between consumers and contenders. In this section we will assume A1, identical agents and that the optimum is symmetric.
802
Denoting by y the common value of the efforts/investments (6.1) becomes
To find the optimal contest we choose φ( ) and n in order to maximize W with the 805 restriction that efforts are those made in a Nash equilibrium of the contest. In the case 806 in which we only choose the number of contenders, we know that under A1 for each 807 n we have a unique Nash equilibrium. We represent this by means of the function 808 y = y(n) which summarizes the restriction faced by the planner.
809
In this subsection and the next we will be concerned with the case in which α = 1.
810
This case may be a good approximation to a situation where the number of consumers 811 is very large in relation to the number of contenders, as in the example of the Olympic
812
Games. An implication of this assumption is that in the symmetric case optimality 813 requires maximizing the effort per agent y. 
is increasing in γ. (6.3)
819
(6.3) means that γ raises the elasticity of φ( ) with respect to G i . For instance, if
Proof Under our assumptions (3.4) reads 
Hence y is maximized with the largest value of γ.
830
To get a feeling for the previous result let us go back to the case where φ(
Here, γ measures how the probability of getting the prize responds to efforts, for value of γ is optimal, provided that an equilibrium can be guaranteed.
837
Suppose now that the planner can choose the number of active contenders:
838
Remark 6.1 Under A1 the optimal number of active contenders is two.
839
Proof Maximizing φ(y) amounts to maximizing y which, according to Proposition 840 3.2, amounts to minimizing n. 23
841
The interpretation of this result is that competition is bad because it yields a low 842 level of effort by the winner but monopoly is even worse because it yields no effort. receive one prize). Let p l i l = 1, 2, . . . k be the probability that agent i obtains prize l.
873
We will assume that 
891
Maximizing y yields the result.
892
The interpretation of this result lies in the fact that l's measure how the probability 
